- The 4th US Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld North Carolina's sex offender registration law.
- Two nonprofit groups had challenged the law in federal court as violating offenders' constitutional right against ex post facto punishment.
- A unanimous three-judge appellate panel agreed with a trial court that plaintiffs did not offer the "clearest proof" that sex offender registration is "sufficiently punitive" to violate the US Constitution.
A unanimous 4th US Circuit Court of Appeals panel has upheld North Carolina’s sex offender registration law. Appellate judges agreed with a trial court that the law does not violate offenders’ constitutional rights.
Two nonprofit groups — the National Association for Rational Sex Offense Laws and North Carolinians for Rational Sex Offense Laws — had challenged the registration requirement in a federal lawsuit.
“Like all other states and the federal government, North Carolina has enacted a sex offender registration statute that imposes various obligations and restrictions on people convicted of certain crimes,” Chief Judge Albert Diaz wrote in the 4th Circuit opinion issued Friday. “The statute requires that qualifying offenders provide (and regularly update) state law enforcement with certain information. It also restricts where registrants can work, live, and visit.”
The law requires offenders to provide personal information to their local sheriffs, and “the statute broadly prohibits registrants from working in roles involving supervision of minors, as well as from a handful of specific roles that may involve interacting with minors, such as driving a school bus or commercial passenger vehicle, or working in emergency medical services,” Diaz explained.
North Carolina’s law also limits offenders from visiting schools or playgrounds or living near schools or childcare centers. The law generally applies for 30 years. Some offenders can petition to end restrictions after 10 years. Others face restrictions for life. An offender who violates the law can face a felony charge.
US District Judge Loretta Biggs rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the restrictions violated the “Ex Post Facto Clause” of Article I, Section 10 of the US Constitution. “Because Plaintiffs failed to show by the ‘clearest proof’ that the effects were sufficiently punitive, the court concluded that retroactive application of the challenged amendments was consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause,” Diaz wrote.
“[W]e take the legislature at its express word that it intended to create a civil, nonpunitive regime,” Diaz wrote, rejecting the critics’ argument that registration amounted to a new punishment after their criminal sentences.
“Plaintiffs contend that the statute is excessive with respect to its public safety purpose because its restrictions apply broadly to all offenders without regard for whether an individual offender is dangerous,” the 4th Circuit opinion added. “But registration statutes need not make individualized determinations of dangerousness.”
“[T]hat some offenders may not pose a danger doesn’t render the statute excessive with respect to its public safety purpose,” Diaz wrote. “Nor does the statute apply to an excessively broad category of offenses.”
Appellate judges rejected the argument that the registration law amounts to a form of public banishment. “Although the restrictions at issue here are severe, their effects aren’t akin to banishment,” Diaz wrote.
“To begin, registrants may still live in much of North Carolina. Plaintiffs presented evidence that 49% of housing in Charlotte, 48.3% in Raleigh, and 42.8% in Greensboro would be off-limits as options to registrants. But this leaves over half of each of these metropolitan areas available, demonstrating that the registrants aren’t at all ‘expelled’ from the community,” the opinion explained. “Moreover, the district court’s finding that only 411 out of the State’s 25,063 registrants are homeless, shows that registrants have managed to find some housing despite these restrictions.”
“Though the registration statute imposes difficult burdens on qualifying offenders, and furthers the goals of punishment to some extent, the remaining factors — including the ‘most important’ one — all favor the State,” Diaz concluded. “On balance, we can’t say that the record evidence shows by the ‘clearest proof’ that the statute is so excessive that it negates the legislature’s plainly nonpunitive intent.”
Judges Paul Niemeyer and Julius Richardson joined Diaz’s opinion.