I’m hawkish on Iraq. But I’m also aware of the risks involved, and I remain respectful of the position of some that while Saddam Hussein is a monster, national socialist, and madman, he isn’t our problem. I understand the historical pedigree and plausibility of the non-interventionist, non-imperial position, though I do not agree with it (the Southwestern United States is much better off, and freer, because it was wrested from Mexico by military force, I would contend).
Here’s an argument I can’t abide, however. Saddam is a very real threat, either to his neighbors or us or both, but don’t worry – we can contain and deter him. One reason I can’t abide the argument is that some who make it are unprincipled and dishonest.
Let’s be clear as to what the deterrence argument assumes. Saddam, it is said, may well develop weapons of mass destruction. He may perfect high-order nerve agents. He may mass-produce biological weapons. He may finally achieve a breakthrough in his long-running nuclear program. But he’ll never use it. He can’t strike Israel with it, because he knows that the Israelis would respond with overwhelming nuclear force. He can’t smuggle it into the U.S., via his own agents or al Qaeda accomplices, for the same reason — he would know that his country would be leveled by nuclear retaliation.
This is utter nonsense.
Does anyone really believe that a modern-day American president – be it George W. Bush, or John Kerry, or John Edwards – would order a nuclear strike in Baghdad that would kill hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis in retaliation for a terrorist strike against a U.S. city? I don’t believe it. Perhaps in the Cold War context, mutually assured destruction (MAD) was a plausible theory of deterrence. It is not, I think, in the context of asymmetrical power and inevitable doubt about the origins of a terrorist strike.
It is somewhat more believable to expect Israel to retaliate with nukes if attacked with nukes or germs, but only somewhat. Again, deterrence theory requires a lot of confidence in one’s assumptions. Awesome weapons deter only if potential aggressors have a reasonable expectation that their victims will be willing to use them. Saddam could well calculate that the political and moral pressure on America, and maybe on Israel, would inhibit a devastating retaliation. Even if he is wrong, and I’m not sure he is, it only matters that he may well think this is true. If deterrence fails, devastation results.
Notice that I am not making the argument some make, that Saddam is so loony that deterrence theory based on rationality doesn’t apply to him. I don’t think you have to assume that in order to foresee a failure of deterrence, though the possibility can’t be discounted.
By all means, if you are a pacifist, and believe that no tyranny or threat justifies the use or threat of violence, then be a pacifist. This can be a noble position to take.
And by all means, if you are a strict non-interventionist who quotes John Quincy Adams and believes Saddam to be someone else’s monster to slay, then be a non-interventionist and advocate Fortress America.
But if you profess to want to respond to the threat Saddam poses to his neighbors or in alliance with terrorists, and you are willing to do so with military force, then don’t claim to oppose Bush’s war while favoring containment and nuclear deterrence. A preemptive war will likely involve civilian casualties, but can be considered a just war in my opinion. The threat of nuclear retaliation, however, is a monstrous policy that threatens the lives of many times more innocents on both sides.
Hood is president of the John Locke Foundation and publisher of Carolina Journal.