RALEIGH — James Robbins had an interesting piece on the National Review Online site Monday that examined the strategy and tactics of France’s veto in the United Nations Security Council. Robbins argued that while the French clearly want to forestall any action to depose Saddam Hussein — they are concerned both about growing American power and their own trading relationship with the Baath regime — they may not want to use their veto as a permanent member of the council to squelch a new resolution against Hussein.

Or, at least, they may not want other countries to know theyíre willing to veto the resolution, because such knowledge would liberate wavering countries such as Mexico or Pakistan to vote for the resolution, thus maintaining good relations with the U.S., while confident that it would be defeated anyway by a French veto.

I’m not really writing today about the Iraqi war (there will be plenty of time for that later in the month, when the war starts). I’m reacting to the NRO article’s explicit comparison between the UN Security Council’s legislative politics and those of members of Congress, who also game the system to mix and maximize the advantages of appearance and outcome.

Longtime observers of the North Carolina legislature will attest to the same pattern. Particularly on issues of great controversy, such as a state lottery, lawmakers can vote “no” when they really mean “yes,” or vote “yes” when they really mean “no.” For example, legislators may want to go on record as opposing a tax increase, so as to protect them in a difficult primary or general election, while secretly wanting the overall state budget to be enacted without additional changes. Maybe they’ve successfully inserted some pork for their districts. Maybe they just want an interminable session to end. So they count heads, figure the budget will pass easily, and then cast a “no” vote.

Similarly, members sometimes vote “yes” when they are pretty much assured a bill will lose regardless. That might satisfy the bill’s proponents back home, an influential lobbyist, or another member whose vote is needed on a bill that might actually pass.

Of course, as Robbins pointed out in the case of France and the UN, sometimes playing these games can get you in big trouble. If enough members expect a budget to pass and then vote “no,” it may surprisingly fail. If enough members vote “yes” in a seemingly and essentially unpopular lost cause, it may slip through.

Legislators, and France, have the potential to out-smart themselves, as odd as that statement sounds.

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Hood ([email protected]) is president of the John Locke Foundation and publisher of Carolina Journal.